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The Pharmaceutical Industry and
World Intellectual Property
Standards
F. M. Scherer*
When I was a high school student during the late 1940s, the
first so-called "wonder drugs"-initially penicillin and then the
broad-spectrum antibiotics such as tetracycline-were entering the
U.S. market. From their profitable experience developing the broad-
spectrum antibiotics, the leading pharmaceutical companies of
America and Europe acquired a strong research orientation that led
to a cascade of new therapeutic entities, including additional anti-
infectives, vaccines, diuretics, and then other agents to reduce
heart attack risks, tranquilizers, antidepressants, birth control
pills, anti-fungal agents, immunosuppressants, cortico-steroids,
AIDS inhibitors, powerful pain relief agents, and many other
agents effective against specific diseases. Thanks to this pharma-
ceutical revolution, life spans have been prolonged, the incidence
and duration of hospital stays have been reduced, and the quality of
countless citizens' lives has been enhanced.'
The benefits of modern pharmaceutical therapy have accrued
mainly to the citizens of the world's more prosperous nations.
United Nations staff have estimated that average purchases per
capita of modern pharmaceutical products (excluding traditional
* Aetna Professor of Public Policy Emeritus, Harvard University; Visiting Professor,
Princeton University.
1. See FRANK R LICHTENBERG, THE EFFECT OF PHARMACEUTICAL UTILIZATION AND
INNOVATION ON HOSPITALIZATION AND MORTALITY 23, (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. w5418, 1996) (estimating that a $1 increase in pharmaceutical purchases was
associated on average with a $2.65 reduction in hospitalization expenditures), available at
http:/papers.nber.org/papers/w5418.
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medicines) in 1990 (calculated at prevailing exchange rates) in di-
verse parts of the world were as follows:
2
North America $123.90
European Community 102.90
Other Western Europe 85.70
Japan 276.60
South and East Asia 5.00
China 4.80
Latin America 20.30
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.30
A rough extrapolation of these figures reveals that the 73
percent of the world's 1990 population located in south and east
Asia, including China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America,
consumes only 16.2 percent of modern pharmaceutical output by
dollar volume. One consequence of the inadequate purchasing
power that limits such nations' ability to consume pharmaceuticals
is a higher rate of morbidity and debility, which in turn impairs the
growth of income so that pharmaceuticals can be afforded-a vi-
cious cycle.
Nearly all of the research-oriented pharmaceutical compa-
nies responsible for innovations in drug therapy have their home
bases in the United States, the European Community nations, or
Japan, where demand is most intense and highly able scientists
interacting with first-rate universities are at hand. Excepting those
of Japan, the research-oriented pharmaceutical companies are
among the most multinationally oriented enterprises in the world.
Discovering a new drug and carrying it through the tests re-
quired to obtain marketing approval from regulatory agencies in
the United States and Europe costs upwards of $100 million per
successful new chemical entity. Once such a large investment has
been made, there are powerful incentives to obtain requisite regula-
tory approvals in other nations and sell the product as widely as
possible. Foreign markets are served both by exporting, often from
a tax haven such as Puerto Rico, Ireland, or Singapore, and through
direct plant investment in consuming nations. According to United
Nations estimates, pharmaceutical imports averaged 8.2 percent of
domestic consumption during 1989 in developed nations and 19.8
2. See ROBERT BALLANCE, THE WoRL'S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIEs: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND POLICY 30-31 (1992).
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percent in less-developed nations.3 In 1980, approximately 27 per-
cent of the world's dcmand was satisfied through local production
by foreign-owned companies. 4 Since then, the extent of multi-
national operation has increased, in part due to numerous cross-
border mergers. In 1995, members of the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America trade association recorded prescrip-
tion drug sales of $65 billion within the United States and $37 bil-
lion outside the United States.5
Most of the R&D outlays incurred by pharmaceutical compa-
nies are made to discover therapeutically interesting molecules and
prove their efficacy and safety through extensive human trials-i.e.,
to create knowledge that approximates what economists call a pure
public good. Absent legal barriers to copying, once a drug has been
found to be safe and effective, another firm might come up with a
generic equivalent by spending roughly a million dollars on produc-
tion process methods and formulation and begin to compete with
the pioneering firm. If such generic imitation were widespread and
rapid, surplus revenues that repay pioneers' initial R&D outlays
and make them worthwhile would be severely eroded, undermining
incentives to invest in research and product testing. Because of the
huge disparity between drug finding and imitation costs, multi-
industry surveys show, pharmaceutical manufacturers attach un-
usually high importance to the patent system, which in effect
grants them 20 years of exclusive rights to their invention from the
time a patent application is filed, as a means of recouping their
R&D expenditures. 6
The combination of multinationality and heavy stress on
patent protection set the stage for a conflict between the pharma-
ceutical manufacturers and the world's developing nations. Under
the Paris Convention to which most of the nations with patent sys-
tems adhered, nations were free to structure their patent laws how-
ever they desired, as long as they did not discriminate between lo-
cal and foreign inventors. Many nations excluded drug products
from patentability because they considered drugs (and for analo-
gous reasons, food products) to be of such great importance to the
national welfare. Even Switzerland, home to three of the world's
leading pharmaceutical companies, abstained until 1977 from
3. See id. at 52.
4. See id. at 68-69.
5. See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, 1998 INDUSTRY
PROFILE 100 (1998).
6. See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Devel-
opment, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783, 807-12 (1987).
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granting drug product patents. Most less-developed countries
("LDCs") followed that pattern and tended more generally to pro-
vide weaker patent protection than the most industrialized na-
tions-actions perfectly compatible with the Paris Convention.
For the multinational pharmaceutical companies, the inabil-
ity to obtain universal patent protection for their new products was
seen as a constraint on their world wide sales and profits, limited
though the potential in LDCs might be due to consumers' meager
purchasing power. An attempt to alter the situation at a World In-
tellectual Property Organization conference in Kenya during the
1970s proved unsuccessful. The drug makers then sought other fora
to pursue their quest. Led by Edward Pratt, CEO of Pfizer Inc. and
a member of President Reagan's business advisory committee on
international trade, the U.S. pharmaceutical companies commenced
a superbly orchestrated campaign to bring the U.S. government
into the dispute.7 They fanned out to enlist the support of motion
picture, music recording, and software industry leaders who were
equally unhappy about the copyright protection they received
abroad. The U.S. pharmaceutical makers in turn enlisted the lob-
bying support of their European counterparts through the so-called
Dolder Group (named after a Swiss hotel at which pharmaceutical
executives met regularly) and also Japanese companies. An astute
public relations campaign succeeded in making "piracy" the ac-
cepted term to describe the imitation of drug or software products
in nations with permissive intellectual property laws, even though
"knock-off' production was quite legal under accepted international
conventions. Lobbying efforts at the U.S. Congress led to amend-
ments in Section 301 of the U.S. international trade code, defining
other nations' failure to grant full patent or copyright protection for
U.S. products as an unfair trade practice and charging the Presi-
dent's Trade Representative Office with monitoring foreign intellec-
tual property practices and identifying for unilaterally imposed
trade sanctions the most egregious perceived offenders.8 Faced with
increased tariffs, loss of most-favored-nation status, or the threat of
such sanctions on the products they sought to export to the United
7. See MHP. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETrrION AND THE POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 67-69 (1998); LYNN SHARP PAINE & MICHAEL SANTORO, PFIZER:
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A GLOBAL MARK=TLACE (Harvard Business School case
study N9-392072 1995), available at http'//www.hbsp.harvard.edu.
8. See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE PoucY AND THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick eds., 1990) (detailing and evaluating section
301).
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States, some nations such as Korea, Thailand, and Brazil strength-
ened their patent and copyright laws and began enforcing them as-
siduously.
Prodded by industrial lobbies, the governments of the United
States, European Union member nations, and Japan insisted that
harmonization of national intellectual property laws be made a key
agenda item in the Uruguay Round of international trade negotia-
tions, initiated in 1986. That effort pitted the leading industrialized
nations working en bloc against the less-developed countries.
LDCs were opposed to granting stronger intellectual prop-
erty rights because such grants seemed so clearly against their na-
tional interests. If they allowed patents on drug products, the
multi-national enterprises ("MNE") would have stronger monopoly
positions in selling their products to the limited array of domestic
consumers able and willing to pay, so prices would be elevated rela-
tive to those charged by local drug makers able to "knock off' the
most advanced products invented elsewhere and sell them at more
competitive prices. Higher prices mean smaller quantities de-
manded and hence lower health benefits from the newest therapies.
If imports were the vehicle through which the MNEs sold their
newest drugs, and probably also if the drugs were produced by local
branch plants, the profits realized would be repatriated to the
MNEs' home countries, imposing a drain on scarce hard-currency
reserves. To be sure, higher sales and profits for the multinationals
would mean stronger incentives to invest in R&D (conducted almost
entirely in highly industrialized nations) and hence the emergence
of more new products. A theoretical analysis of less-developed na-
tions' incentives reveals that to compensate for the loss of domestic
surplus (assuming linear demand functions) as a result of high drug
prices for existing patented products, a threefold increase in the
number of equivalent new products reaching the LDCs would be
required.9 Such a large increase in new products driven solely by
the modest sales increase attributable to newly-authorized patent-
ing in low-income nations seemed highly improbable.
The tradeoff might become more favorable for less-developed
countries if granting patent protection on new drug products
strengthened the incentives of indigenous pharmaceutical compa-
9. See F. M. ScHERER, INDusRY STRucTURE, STRATEGY, AND PuBLIC POLICY 363-65 (1996).
Viewing the situation from the perspective of the world as a whole rather than that of a single LDC,
an increase of less than one-third in the number of equivalent new products will compensate for the
loss of consumers' surplus as a result of monopolized, as compared to competitive, pricing of the new
products that would reach the market without patent protection.
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nies so much that those firms began developing innovative drugs,
selling them at home and perhaps exporting them too. The benefits
from granting product patents would also be enhanced if multina-
tional companies were spurred to develop new drugs explicitly tar-
geted toward diseases prevalent mainly in low-income nations.
Evidence on the first of these possibilities is provided by the
experience of Italy. During the 1950s and 1960s, Italy did not grant
drug product patents. A thriving "knock-off' drug industry
emerged, selling drugs at bargain prices in the home market and
becoming the world's leading exporter of new drugs to other nations
that also denied patent protection to drug products.'0 During the
1970s, however, multinational enterprises challenged the Italian
law, and in 1978, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that the law de-
nying drug product patents was unconstitutional. It ordered that
the law be amended and that the Italian authorities begin accepting
drug patent applications immediately. Analyses of events during
the decade that followed yield three principal conclusions: (1) no
significant increase in Italian drug R&D expenditures relative to
world trends; (2) no significant increase in the number of new drug
entities introduced by Italian firms; and (3) a sharp deterioration of
the Italian trade balance in drugs into the negative realm as export
sales faltered and multinational firms imported many of their
products into Italy from elsewhere in Europe. In addition, numer-
ous Italian drug manufacturers were acquired by multinational
firms seeking to strengthen their foothold in the Italian market. It
is unclear why Italy failed to make the transition from drug imita-
tor to drug innovator. It may be that a decade is too short a time to
do so, or price controls may have impaired domestic market incen-
tives for the development of pioneering drugs. Also, Italy lacked the
university research infrastructure and cooperative university-
industry relationships needed to nourish drug innovation. What is
clear is that leadership in the production and export of knock-off
drugs to nations lacking product patent protection shifted to India.
There is little evidence on the second possibility-an in-
crease in the targeting of drug development efforts toward low-
income nations' health problems by multinational drug companies.
An early investigation of this possibility and also the hypothesis
that the anticipation of domestic future product patent protection
10. Indeed, in the late 1950s, frustrated by the high prices charged for tetracycline by licensees
to the patent held by Pfizer, the U.S. armed forces invoked their statutory right to infringe domestic
patents and purchased tetracycline from Italian firms.
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stimulated Indian manufacturers' new drug discovery efforts up to
1997 yielded equivocal findings."
What some multinational drug companies have done is to
donate already developed drugs such as Zithromax (effective
against trachoma blindness), Ivermectin (effective against river
blindness), and Albendazole (effective against lymphatic filariasis
parasites) to especially poor nations with a high incidence of such
diseases. 12 Four pharmaceutical companies led the list of U.S. cor-
porations, ranked by the total amount of money devoted to philan-
thropic giving in 1998.13 Presumably, the market value of the drugs
donated in this way could be claimed as tax deductions by the donor
corporations. Since the marginal cost of a typical still-patented drug
tends to be on the order of 20 percent of the U.S. wholesale price,
and since for most corporations (but perhaps, because of tax credits
on Puerto Rican production, not the drug makers) the marginal cor-
porate income tax rate is 34 percent, it is conceivable that the drug
companies' charity actually increased the donors' after-tax profits.
If this conjecture is correct, the donation programs may in fact be a
subtle form of foreign aid subsidized by the U.S. Treasury.
As the Uruguay Round negotiations culminated in 1993, the
industrialized nation coalition demanding patent law unification
held firm, and the final draft included a strong Trade-Related In-
tellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") chapter. Less-developed na-
tions were presented with hard choices. On the one hand, they
could agree to strengthen their intellectual property laws and ac-
cept the consequences outlined above. On the other hand, they
could opt out and lose the benefits of World Trade Organization
("WTO") membership, including gradual relaxation of industrialized
nation import restraints against agricultural products and phase-
out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement limiting the export of textiles and
apparel-fields in which many LDCs had found comparative advan-
tage. The best the LDCs could do was to negotiate compromise
clauses in the final draft-notably, allowing LDCs ten years from
January 1995 to implement full drug patent rights and providing
exceptions under which national governments could abridge the
rights granted. Exceptions can occur when monopolistic abuses of
patent rights are proven, or non-exclusive compulsory licensing of
11. See JEAN 0. LANJOUW & IAIN COCKBURN, Do Patents Matter?: Empirical Evidence After
GATT 1-4, (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7495, 2000), available at
http'J/www.nber.org/papersw7495.pdf-
12. See id. at 22-23.
13. The List. Corporate Giving, BUS. WY., Jan. 24,1990, at 8.
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patents with "adequate remuneration" is permitted when a pro-
posed patent licensor has been unable within a reasonable period of
time to "obtain authorization [for domestic use] from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions." Exactly
what these loopholes mean is at best unclear; the provisions are
likely to be contested in future proceedings before the WTO. 14
Meanwhile, the Uruguay Round treaty requires that less-developed
nation signatories accept interim patent applications in a so-called
letter box, granting to the patent applicant exclusive marketing
rights for five years beginning not later than the year 2000 for new
drugs covered by pending applications.
Some nations, such as Brazil, have complied fully with the
TRIPS mandates. In other nations compliance remains bitterly dis-
puted and the subject of U.S. complaints to the WTO. In Argentina,
for example, implementing legislation proposed by President Me-
nem was at first rejected by the Parliament and then passed in a
weakened form that, according to U.S. trade officials, fails to com-
ply with the Uruguay Round treaty language. As of 1999, India had
not passed implementing legislation or delineated procedures for
accepting letter box applications. In April 1999, the United States
government launched a special review threatening trade sanctions
against South Africa for its efforts to import drugs at bargain prices
from nations with no drug product patent protection and to issue
compulsory licenses permitting domestic manufacture of Taxol (ef-
fective against certain forms of cancer) and drugs that could help
combat an AIDS epidemic. A contemplated complaint to the World
Trade Organization concerning South Africa's policies was appar-
ently headed off when AIDS activists threatened to make the U.S.
policies a contested issue in Al Gore's campaign to win the U.S.
presidency. 15 Had the Seattle round of international trade negotia-
tions not collapsed in debacle during December 1999, it was likely
that less-developed nations would have sought reconsideration and
weakening of the Uruguay Round TRIPS agreements.
The debate over drug product patent extension into the
Third World is a classic problem of federalism, questioning whether
14. Exploitation of the loopholes is encouraged in a World Health Organization staff report, to
which the U.S. pharmaceutical company trade association and the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion have taken pointed exception. See World Health Organization Staff Report, Globalization and
Access to Drugs: Implications of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement 32-36 (1998), available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.intlhq/1998/WHOLDAP_98.9_-revised.pdf
15. See Kathy Chenault, Will the AIDS Plague Change U.S. Trade Policy? BUS. WY-, Sept. 13,
1999, at 58.
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economic policy choices should be made locally or by a supervening
governmental entity. Usually decentralization is favored on alloca-
tive efficiency grounds while the possibilities of redistributive eq-
uity pull toward centralization. However, in the TRIPS debate, the
opposite is true. Decentralization of patent policies allows poor na-
tions to address their health problems despite limited resources by
free-riding on wealthy nations' inventions, while the suppression of
free-riding under a centralized policy improves the allocation of
world R&D resources. Curiously, while the TRIPS debate was pro-
ceeding, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a patent law deci-
sion logically inconsistent with the U.S. position on drug product
patents in international fora.
The U.S. Patent Code includes provisions allowing the fed-
eral government to infringe valid patents when infringement serves
the national interest and reasonable compensation is paid.16 The
requirements for reasonable compensation have been interpreted
historically to imply much lower payments than the foregone mo-
nopoly profits standard imposed in private patent infringement
damages cases. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Ex-
pense Board v. College Savings Bank, a majority of the Supreme
Court ruled (over the strong dissent of a four-member minority)
that Congress had exceeded its constitutional powers in nullifying
individual states' sovereign immunity from patent infringement
suits in federal courts, provided that the states maintain their own
in-state legal procedures (either legislative or judicial) to ensure
that the patent holders' property is not taken without due process
of law.17 Armed with that precedent, the states might in the future
seek to alleviate their escalating drug cost burdens under Medicaid
(and possibly in the future Medicare) by setting up patent-
infringing generic drug production operations or importing drugs
from no-patent jurisdictions and offering to pay "reasonable com-
pensation" for the use of the infringed patents. Compensation sub-
stantially less than the monopoly profits foregone by the patent
holders might arguably satisfy the due process requirement.18
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994). For an illustration of an actual case, see supra note 10.
17. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. V. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
18. An example is the position taken by the courts of Canada in implementing the compul-
sory licensing of drugs up to 1987. When Hoffmann-LaRoche requested a flat fee royalty that
would have amounted to 30 percent of the price of Valium before the emergence of generic compe-
tition, the Canadian Exchequer Court set an ad valorem royalty of four percent on sales after the
emergence of generic competition. The Court provided that in setting the terms of the license
and fixing the amount of royalty or other consideration payable, "the Commissioner shall have
regard to the desirability of making the medicine available to the public at the lowest possible
2000] 2253
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One might argue that an analogous bargain must govern the
division of powers between a supranational federalist organization
such as the WTO and its member nations, especially when issues
that are literally a matter of life or death are joined. Indeed, from
the U.S. Senate debate that preceded U.S. ratification of the Uru-
guay Round treaty, it was clear that U.S. legislators were reluctant
to cede such life-or-death powers to a supranational federal body.
For the United States to insist that other member nations should
not infringe patents issued within their home jurisdictions, paying
compensation deemed reasonable under their own judicial or ad-
ministrative processes, would be hypocritical, given the Supreme
Court's strong states' rights position in the Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education case.
What seems clear is that controversy over the Uruguay
Round TRIPS mandates will continue and indeed intensify.
price consistent with giving to the patentee due reward for the research leading to the inven-
tion" See Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Frank W. Horner Ltd., (1970) C.P.R. 107-108. Four per-
cent royalty rates became standard in subsequent drug patent licenses. See F. M. Scherer, The
Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing, in MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FINANCE AND
ECONOMICS 1977, at 47 (N.Y.U. Graduate Sch. Bus. Admin. Center for Study Fin. Inst. Mono-
graph 1977-2, 1977).
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